Lest We Forget
By John L. Frisbee, Contributing Editor
With thanks to George W. Guderley, a survivor of the march.
Published in AIR FORCE Magazine September 1997, Vol. 80, No. 9

POW Monument at Luft 4

During the winter of 1944-45, 6,000 Air Force noncoms took part in an event of mass heroism that has been neglected by history. Most Americans know, in at least a general way, about the Bataan Death March that took place in the Philippines during April 1942. Few have even heard of an equally grim march of Allied POWs in northern Germany, during the winter of 1945, (the most severe winter Europe had suffered in many years). The march started at Stalag Luft IV in German Pomerania (now part of Poland), a POW camp for US and British aircrew men.

Early in 1945, as the Soviet forces continued to advance after their breakout at Leningrad, the Germans decided to evacuate Stalag Luft IV. Some 1500 of the POWs, who were not physically able to walk, were sent by train to Stalag Luft I… On Feb. 6, with little notice, more than 6,000 US and British airmen began a forced march to the west in subzero weather, for which they were not adequately clothed or shod.

Conditions on the march were shocking. There was a total lack of sanitary facilities. Coupled with that was a completely inadequate diet of about 700 calories per day, contrasted to the 3,500 provided by the US military services. Red Cross food parcels added additional calories when and if the Germans decided to distribute them. As a result of the unsanitary conditions and a near starvation diet, disease became rampant; typhus fever spread by body lice, dysentery that was suffered in some degree by everyone, pneumonia, diphtheria, pellagra, and other diseases. A major problem was frostbite that in many cases resulted in the amputation of extremities. At night, the men slept on frozen ground or, where available, in barns or any other shelter that could be found.

The five Allied doctors on the march were provided almost no medicines or help by the Germans. Those doctors, and a British chaplain, stood high in the ranks of the many heroes of the march. After walking all day with frequent pauses to care for stragglers, they spent the night caring for the ill, then marched again the next day. When no medication was available, their encouragement and good humor helped many a man who was on the verge of giving up.

Acts of heroism were virtually universal. The stronger helped the weaker. Those fortunate enough to have a coat shared it with others. Sometimes the Germans provided farm wagons for those unable to walk. There seldom were horses available, so teams of POWs pulled the wagons through the snow. Captain (Dr.) Caplan, in his testimony to the War Crimes Commission, described it as "a domain of heroes."

The range of talents and experience among the men was almost unlimited. Those with medical experience helped the doctors. Others proved to be talented traders, swapping the contents of Red Cross parcels with local civilians for eggs and other food. The price for being caught at this was instant death on both sides of the deal. A few less Nazified guards could be bribed with cigarettes to round up small amounts of local food.

In a few instances, when Allied air attacks killed a cow or horse in the fields, the animal was butchered expertly to supplement the meager rations. In every way possible, the men took care of each other in an almost universal display of compassion. Accounts of personal heroism are legion.

Because of war damage, the inadequacy of the roads, and the flow of battle, not all the POWs followed the same route west. It became a meandering passage over the northern part of Germany. As winter drew to a close, suffering from the cold abated. When the sound of Allied artillery grew closer, the German guards were less harsh in their treatment of POWs.

The march finally came to an end when the main element of the column encountered Allied forces east of Hamburg on May 2, 1945. They had covered more than 600 miles in 87 never-to-be-forgotten days.

In 1992, the American survivors of the march funded and dedicated a memorial at the former site of Stalag Luft IV in Poland, the starting place of a march that is an important part of Air Force history. It should be widely recognized and its many heroes honored for their valor.

Additional Stories:

Although thousands of Allied airmen suffered at their hands, the Germans who ran Stalag Luft 4 have remained largely anonymous. Rumors have persisted for decades about their real identities and their fates at war's end. Only the most determined effort has revealed who they were and what were their deeds. Records held at the National Archives and the U.N. Archives had to be combined with personal narratives from people directly involved in the legal process.

The War Crimes Trial briefs filed by England and the United States are the most direct source of names. Hauptman Richard Pickhardt, Col. Aribert Bombach, obfwl. Reinhard Fahnert and Feldwebel Hans Schmidt were held responsible for an organized reign of terror (lasting from March,1944 until May,1945). Four unarmed American POW's had been shot. In particular, the transfer of 2,000 prisoners from Hydekrug to Kiefheide (July 1944) was cited as a violation of Article 2 of the Geneva Convention, which states:

"Prisoners are in the power of hostile governments, but not of individuals. They shall at all times be treated humanely, particularly against acts of violence... and measures of reprisal..."

German POW camps are generally acknowledged to have observed the letter of the law, but were often a world unto themselves; isolated kingdoms, in far off places, where men of cruelty and ill will could do their worst... away from the prying eyes of civilization and the rule of law. Rank and military necessity were their cloak and disguise. "The Mad Captain" (Pickhardt) and "Big Stoop" (Hans Schmidt) were two of the most notorious Germans from Luft 4.

The legal machinery for investigation, apprehension and trial of these men, began in January 1944. The Judge Advocate was directed to establish a War Crimes Office. Later, a coalition was established between the Navy, the War Department and the State Department to oversee these matters. The job was expected to be completed by 1948. War Crimes offices were established in both the Pacific and European theaters; these joined a network of agencies set up by other Allies. Before the invasion, SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) was the operational authority. After the surrender of Germany, SHAFE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe) took over the job. The 12th Army Group was assigned the duties of occupation.

In July, 1945, Military Government Tribunals were assigned the task of dealing with, " cases involving offenses against the laws and usages of war." The Military Occupation Government was in charge, because it had direct control of both German and Allied POW's, as well as the population of former Axis territories.

The 12th Army Group had its own Judge Advocate General section, with four War Crimes Branches. Each one had their own investigating teams. After an incident was reported, they would determine the names and descriptions of the perpetrators; then investigate, locate and arrest them.

The U.N. War Crimes Commission had a list and the investigating teams could file a wanted report with CROWCASS. The Central Registry for War Criminals and Security Suspects was set up to pool all the data and issue regular reports. Identifying and tracking down thousands of suspects across Europe was an extraordinary effort. Their mandate was short, and the teams from the War Crimes Branch were involved with both civilian and military crimes. The "Malmedy Massacre" and the "Vienenberg Incident" were cases where Americans had been captured and murdered. Concentration camps also came under their jurisdiction. The Dachau Detachment was one of the units assigned to investigate War Crimes perpetrated at Lufts 6 and Luft 4.

The process was similar to a grand jury hearing. Prosecutors from the War Crimes Tribunal prepared a trial brief containing a short "statement of facts", the "particulars of the crime" and the evidence. An evaluation was made by Committee 1, to advise if "prima faciae" case existed, give legal opinions or suggest penalties. The authority to go ahead with a trial, rested with the Commanding Officer within the Zone of Occupation.

Over 8000 cases were examined, naming 37,000 individuals. The Luft 4 case was typical, in that much of the early evidence was vague or incomplete. However, by mid 1945, testimony of released prisoners was available. This made it somewhat easier to form a precise charge. Ironically, as it became easier to collect evidence, the committee tightened its' rules for the submission of a case. Because they were so thorough, only five cases were completely rejected ( at trial).

The prosecution had to show that a war crime of "reasonable importance" had been committed, and that a trial would lead to a conviction. Not only was the nature of the offense important, but could the offenders be identified? Was the offense committed in obedience to orders and what would be the probable defence?

The record shows that an extraordinary effort was mounted to bring to justice, the officers and key guards from Stalag Lufts 6 and 4. The paper trail begins with a letter to the Swiss legation and to the Commandant of Luft IV ( Lt. Col. Bombach). It is signed by Man of Confidence, Frank Paules and dated 20 July, 1944 :

" I have the honor to submit the following complaints and request that they be forwarded to the Protecting Powers:

On the 15th of July,1944, approximately 1700 prisoners were transferred from KGF nr. 6 to KGF nr.4

1. On board the ship... the prisoners were crowded into the hold...without provisions for hygienic necessities... or water...no life preservers were provided...conditions were enforced for over 40 hours.

2. Upon disembarking,prisoners were handcuffed for the duration of their journey...then forced to march from the train...in the charge of guards with fixed bayonets and dogs...making it impossible to carry their baggage.

3. Upon arrival at KGF lager nr.4 ... the prisoners...were struck with gun butts and subjected to insults...others suffered bayonet wounds. I protest that these points were violations of the Geneva Convention relative to prisoners of war ...to be observed by the German Military Authorities."

An exhaustivly complete account of the four day journey from Hydekrug to Kiefeheide, was detailed on October 10, by the Swiss delegate Albert Kadler. This document became the early basis for British and American prosecutor's claims that a war crime had occurred. Kadler's report included a hint that camp administrators, rather than their superiors could be held responsible :

" One German officer...accompanying prisoners from Dulag Luft... protested very strongly against the treatment received... on the way to camp...The result was that the head of the POW section of the OKW, Oberst Westhoff, made an inspection of Luft IV. Since then... the treatment prisoners receive between the station... and the camp... can be considered as satisfactory."

The Germans, for their part,issued a reply to Sgt. Frank Paules protest,through their State Department:

"Investigations (by the Minister of Aviation) revealed that the statements...are considerably exaggerated. The distance of 3km from the station to the camp was easily covered in 25 minutes. As the prisoners were young and athletic men... the marching pace was in no way too fast... For reasons of security, the distance had to be covered (rapidly). A slow pace might have favored escapes...The guards had been ordered to be severe towards stubbornness or provocative behavior... if injuries occurred,they are light, according to the German troop doctor."

In September there had been a repatriation of four Americans from Luft VI. Following this, on November 1,1944, the Judge Advocate received a "Report on War Crimes Cases" forwarded by MIS (Military Information Service). Specific knowledge of the German personnel was limited at the time, but the file of names had begun. It was known that Luft 6 was administered by an aging Prussian officer, who was struggling to run his camp in a military fashion. His efforts were being compromised by Gestapo tactics and red tape. In theory, the Commandant was to oversee the activities of the OKW officers (army), the Luftwaffe guards and the Abwehr (security).In reality, there was a civilian Gestapo man working closely with the Abwehr security forces. Any notions about prisoners rights were eroded by the internal struggles for power at the camp.

MIS had been in communication with camp leaders by means of coded letters. Now they could supply the testimony of actual witnesses :

" ...certain soldiers, under the command of Major Gruber (Luft 6), did, on July 18,1944 (inflict) cruel treatment on prisoners of war. Also accused is Captain Raypert and unidentified German soldiers."

Although new and disjointed, the investigation widened each month, like a beacon searching the dark. Col. Bombach, second in command at Hydekrug, had assumed total control of the new camp. Surrounded by a cadre of dedicated Nazis, he had a penal colony approach to authority; there would be no escapes and the guards behavior was unrestrained.

Stalag Luft IV swelled its ranks to nearly 10,000 Allied prisoners, from May 1944, until February,1945. At that time, camps all over the Eastern front were evacuated and the men began their long "Black March" on the "Shoe Leather Express" back into Germany. The officers and guards accompanied the prisoners along their several routes of march.

The British were pursuing an aggressive policy towards war crimes ( the U.K. had filed 1077 cases by May of 1946, compared to only 318 for the U.S.). There were nine cases against the Commandant, officers and guards of Luft 4. An early brief states:

"The accused have to be identified, but an investigation was held by the Germans. (This) should at least identify the senior officer... However, the indications are that wholesale destruction of records is taking place, whenever possible. Further evidence may be taken from prisoners concerned... it is hardly conceivable that (the names) are not known to the protecting powers."

Regarding the boat trip across the Baltic, British investigators noted :

" It will be said that conditions were distorted by the course of military operations ...but...even if it was necessary to have so many men on the boat, conditions could have been improved... and the German authorities refused..."

Commenting on the "run up the road" :

" The guards will no doubt plead that they were acting under orders...by their officers to ill treat the prisoners. It is also clear that they were given a freehand... to act on their own initiative."

" The defence will be... that stern measures were necessary for security...owing to the...provocative attitude of the prisoners. Neither of these defenses can be considered as good (since) conditions improved after the inspection by Oberst Westhoff."

By April of 1945, the general assessment was: "There is a good prima Fasciae case and further evidence will be obtainable." Between April and August, briefs were filed against Otto Rottig (Inspector General of POW camps) and then against "the Commandant and Officers of Luft IV". As things came into focus, the case was named for Pickhardt, the major perpetrator. At least six provisions of the Geneva Conventions had been violated, the main thrust involving Articles 2 and 11. These dealt with assault and unlawful wounding of prisoners. In December, the British turned the case over to the Americans, in order to avoid duplication of effort: "The accused will be dealt with in one case... which is #1628/ U.S. against Germany case# 1."

Included in the evidence were some extraordinary documents; the arrest reports for three of the accused : Pickhardt, Bombach and Fahrnert. They had been picked up on November 11,1945 in Austria just south of Salzburg. At 10 pm, in the town of Kukels,( a stones throw from Berchtesgarten), Aribiert Bombach was apprehended.

"Information was received that this man is wanted... as a war criminal by the U.S.A. ... for ill- treatment of American POW's. A quantity of cigarettes and food from Red Cross parcels was found in possession of a woman living with the accused. This property was believed looted from ( the camp)..."

An hour later, Reinhard Fahnert was arrested at the same location: "Former Abwehr N.C.O. of Luft Stalag 4 - suspected as a war criminal."

The actual filing of a War Crimes Brief, by the U.S., was a watershed event. It was received by the U.N. Commission on October 6,1945 and represented months of intensive work by many individuals. Lt. Col. Gilbert Allen had been appointed Investigator- Examiner for the matters at hand. His report,dated 18 may cited:

"The treacherous and unprovoked shooting of an American POW, in violation of Article 23, Laws and Customs of War, Hague Convention no.IV ; and violation of Article 2, Geneva Convention."

As liberated prisoners streamed back into Allied control, scores of investigators took testimony from them at Camp Lucky Strike, in France. Later, back at hospitals in the States, case files were developed around the shooting deaths of Aubry Teague, George Walker, Walter Getsey and Walter Nies. The identities of the guards involved remained a mystery, but profiles of their officers began to emerge. Capt.Pickhardt and Sgt. Schmidt were the most notorious of the Germans associated with the "Run up the Road". Col. Bombach, Capt. Raypert and Maj. Gruber were identified as the officers in charge of the evacuation of Luft 6. In a memorandum of 23 May, the Judge Advocate states:

"There is sufficient evidence to support a charge of cruel treatment...it is believed that with further investigation... a charge of murder can be proven...The German officers' ... names (should) be placed on the wanted list for war criminals."

Through June and July, statements by American prisoners broadened the scope of events and focused attention on others in the Luft 4 cadre. The apprehension of Maj. Gerber became the key to solving the shootings of Sgts. Walker and Nies (it was felt he was the officer in charge). Feldwebel Fahnert and Hauptman Mueller were sought in connection with the Teague investigation. Mistreatment of prisoners in camp and on the Black March, was attributed to Cpls. Stemberger, Greenwald and Sgt. Schmidt.

As the months wore on, the cases were consolidated under the name of Pickhardt. Lager officers Schliep, Wienart, Zallman and Wolf were added to the growing list of the accused, and the file was given an "A" classification (ready for prosecution). Key testimony was given by Frank Paules about the inner workings of the German staff. Their shadowy world was thrown into the spotlight, revealing character and deeds for the record.

In its' final form, Register #1648 "United States against Germany- case #1" , named 14 officers and guards as the perpetrators of crimes against prisoners during the evacuation of Luft 6 and afterwards, at Luft 4.

In spite of the capture of Pickhardt, Bombach and Fahnert, the case languished. In 1946, Special Agents were sent out to confirm the identities of the accused who'd been caught. They showed photos to a number of those who'd witnessed the shootings or been on the camp staff. It appears that few German records were obtained by the Judge Advocate, and American camp files were buried when the camp was evacuated. No "paper link" was established between the accused and the events. In a letter dated 19 September,1947, Maj. Walter L. Parker wrote the epitaph for the case:

" This case consists of 58 volumes of testimony,44 of which (are) statements of liberated prisoners. No (further) investigation has been made of this case... because of the highly contradictory nature of the statements... A thorough investigation would be necessary to prepare... for trial... and would be much more difficult than normal (because) the camp is in Poland ...The attitude of... local witnesses may have changed with the lapse of time...

A good many leads are offered... among them: records buried at the camp... pictures... from which other perpetrators might be identified... if they could be located...

It does not appear that the case can be developed into a triable...(murder) category. Bombach, Pickhardt, and Fahnert are the only (ones) ever to have been in our custody (and) have been released."

The question arises: were the War Crimes Trials to exact retribution or to demonstrate principals of law? In a world of such intense and widespread savagery, could the deeds of Pickhardt and "Big Stoop" be considered crimes of "reasonable importance"? Capt. John Wolff and his associates wrestled with that very dilemma. He was the deputy co-chairman of Committee 1:

"I was sent to England in early 1944, by the Judge Advocate, to represent the U.S. The task was to set up the legal apparatus for the trials, because it was certain they would be held. The subject we dealt with was grim, and life in London was by no means pleasant.

My associates had come from all over Europe, and many of them were distinguished legal minds. There was a sense of purpose and our people were highly motivated. An extraordinary effort was made by the Allies to determine when war crimes had occurred. The function of Committee 1, was to look at the evidence and examine each case on its own merits.

Although there were not a great many trials dealing with allegations by prisoners, one of the outcomes of the tribunals was to re-affirm conventions requiring humane treatment. It was also held that obeying illegal orders could be the basis for a charge."

There is a legend among former POW's from Luft IV, that justice was served with, at least, one of the perpetrators. S/Sgt. Robert Scalley was a witness:

"My group left Nuremberg on April 8th, 1945 and marched to Mooseburg (arriving April 16). General Patton liberated us on April 29 and played "Don't Fence Me In" on the German P.A. system. Later, three buddies and I went through the fence. We liberated a ham, some beer and some schnapps. After feasting and having a nip or two, we decided to head back to camp (about 4 miles away). It was dark, and as we got closer to the camp, someone shouted: "Hey, what's that?"

Just off the road, we saw something with our matches. It was a large body with no blouse, shirt, shoes or belt; nothing in the pants pockets and no head! We had to get back into camp by the main gate, as it was too dark to find out where we had gone out.

When we told the M.P. at the gate, what we had seen, he said,"It can wait 'till morning! Go back to your tent and sleep it off!" I'm almost certain it was Big Stoop."